A change only counts once it is secured
What can a monitoring system promise a customer who is subject to audits? We examined our own capture path the way an auditor would — and turned the result into a promise that can be checked. Including what the examination found.
Publishing a null result — and correcting one of our own figures
Xommodo is complete and the final report is out: no candidate survived the pre-registered criterion. While re-running the numbers we found that a figure published here in August was wrong — and why a tamper-evident chain could carry it anyway.
Vulnerability validation: why a failed attempt is no proof of security
A failed exploit attempt does not establish the absence of a vulnerability. Why sound validation needs four verdict classes instead of a yes/no — with examples reproduced in the lab and a traceable evidence log.
Xommodo: a track record that proves itself
Progress log of our forecasting research demo: quantile forecasts for commodity prices, committed before the outcome is known — with a hash-chain ledger and OpenTimestamps anchors on the Bitcoin blockchain. Update 08/2026: research concluded — the ledger remains verifiable as a public archive, the results appear as a paper.
Tamper-evident audit logs without a server farm
How a SHA-256 hash chain over append-only JSONL makes every retrospective change, deletion or reordering of log entries detectable — and why the deliberately documented limit of the design is a gain for any compliance team.